Prawdziwość zarzutu na gruncie karnoprawnej regulacji przestępstwa zniesławienia

The article relates to a concept of truth in the light of the legal regulation of defamation crime (Articles 212 and 213 of the Criminal Code). The author describes two issues: firstly the problem of distinguishing by Polish courts facts from opinions from the point of view of the concept of truth in defamation trials, and secondly the problem of criminal liability for true statements on the basis of the defamation crime regulation. In his deliberations the author uses judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, decisions of Polish courts as well as main thesis of the criminal law doctrine and some opinions present in the public debate about the legitimacy of defamation crime. The author comes to the following conclusions. As far as the first issue is concerned, the author takes the view that Polish courts, in defamation trials, do not distinguish facts (which truthfulness can be proved) from opinions (which truthfulness cannot be proved) and as for all statements they require to prove their truthfulness. As far as the second issue is concerned, the author takes the view that on the basis of the defamation crime regulation, it is possible to make someone criminally liable for true statements, which is harmful and should be changed.